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Abstract In this paper we give an analytic tableau calculus PL16 for a function-
ally complete extension of Shramko and Wansing’s logic. The calculus is based on
signed formulas and a single set of tableau rules is involved in axiomatising each of
the four entailment relations |=t , |=f , |=i , and |= under consideration—the differ-
ences only residing in initial assignments of signs to formulas. Proving that two sets
of formulas are in one of the first three entailment relations will in general require
developing four tableaux, while proving that they are in the |= relation may require
six.
Keywords Trilattice SIXTEEN3 · Tableau calculi · Functional completeness · Truth
entailment · Falsity entailment · Information entailment
1 Introduction
In [14] Yaroslav Shramko and HeinrichWansing define an attractive generalisation of
Belnap’s well-known four-valued logic (see [3, 4]). Where Belnap generalises classi-
cal two-valued propositional logic and moves from the set of truth values 2 = {1, 0}
to the set 4 = P(2) of combinations of truth values, Shramko & Wansing repeat the
move and consider logics based on 16 = P(4)—combinations of combinations of
classical truth values. Belnap’s original motivation for the move from 2 to 4—a logic
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based on this set can model how a computer should deal with the incomplete and/or
inconsistent information that may be fed to it—is extended as well, as the logic based
on 16 arguably models how a network should reason on the basis of input it gets from
computers reasoning on the basis of 4.
These moves from 2 to 4 and from 4 to 16 come with an increasing number of lat-
tice orderings. There is of course the usual ordering on 2, but Belnap considers two
orders on 4. The first of these is that of the logical lattice L4, in which the values
T = {1}, F = {0}, N = ∅, and B = {1, 0} are ordered in a way that corresponds
to an extension of the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme (see Fig. 1 for a Hasse dia-
gram). The second is the ordering of the approximation of information lattice A4, in
which the same values are ordered according to their degree of information. Together
these two orderings form what is called a bilattice. On 16 Shramko & Wansing con-
sider three orderings, denoted with ≤t , ≤f , and ≤i , together forming the so-called
trilattice SIXTEEN3. Of these three, ≤t can be interpreted as a truth order, ≤f as a
falsity order, and ≤i again as an approximation of information order. The lattice L4,
which in fact acts as a truth and falsity order, is thus replaced by two independent
orderings, not each other’s inverses, as will become apparent below.
Meet and join operations on these lattices can naturally be associated with con-
junction and disjunction operators, but there are unary functions that can interpret
negation too. Belnap [4] already considers a negation operation on 4 that swaps T
and F, but leaves N and B untouched, but it has a natural dual in the operation that
swaps N and B but leaves T and F as is. On SIXT EEN3 there are three involutions
−t , −f , and −i that are natural candidates to provide the semantics for negation
connectives in a logical language.
We thus see that SIXT EEN3 is well-understood (more precise definitions are to
follow after this introduction). But the proof theory of logics based on this trilattice is
another matter (see also Odintsov & Wansing’s [10] section 1.2 on ‘the axiomatiza-
tion problem’). We are aware of several approaches. Odintsov [9], for example, gives
Hilbert style axiomatisations of the truth entailment relation |=t naturally based on
≤t and the falsity entailment relation |=f based on ≤f . Another way of dealing with
this problem is exemplified in Wansing [16], where cut-free sequent calculi for |=t
and |=f are presented. And a third way can be found in Odintsov & Wansing’s [10],
where a so-called ‘bi-calculus’ for the t and f consequence relations is given. More
Fig. 1 Belnap’s lattices L4 and A4
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sequent and tableau systems for SIXT EEN3 related logics are presented in Kamide
& Wansing [5] and in Wansing & Kamide [18].
But something is still to be wished for, as the logical languages that have been
considered do not provide a set of connectives that is functionally complete for 16.
In particular, we are not aware of an existing system in which a connective ∧i corre-
sponding to meet in the ≤i order is definable. (Odintsov’s and Wansing’s logics are
based on connectives corresponding to meet and join in the ≤t and ≤f orderings,
plus, in the case of some logics, certain implications →t and →f that are residua
with respect to these orderings. But ∧i cannot be defined in any of the resulting lan-
guages, as will become clear below). Since ∧i can be thought of as formalising a
sceptical information merging strategy that one may reasonably want a computer net-
work to follow, there is some interest in clarifying its proof theory and characterising
its interactions with other connectives.
The purpose of this paper therefore is to give a calculus that characterises a propo-
sitional logic that expresses all of SIXT EEN3, i.e. deals with all truth functions on
16. We will provide such a logic with the help of a generalisation of the approach
in Wintein & Muskens [19], where a calculus for a functionally complete first-order
logic based on Belnap’s two lattices was given. That paper was based on two ideas
that are relevant here. The first of these—taken over fromMuskens [8] and ultimately
from Langholm [6]—was to use a four-sided sequent calculus,1 the second idea was
to let each proof correspond to two proof trees in the usual sense (see also Win-
tein & Muskens [20]). We will generalise this approach by giving a signed analytic
tableau calculus based on eight signs and by letting proofs correspond to four or even
six tableaux (an eight-sided Gentzen sequent variant could easily be given). From a
semantic point of view, each of the eight signs (for which we use t, f, n, b,  t,  f,  n,
and  b) signals whether an element from 4 = {T,F,N,B} is present or absent in the
value of the sentence that is signed and each tableau checks whether one of these four
values is transmitted from premises to conclusions or vice versa. While the descrip-
tion just given may seem to point to a rather complicated system, the calculus is in
fact simple and can be used to provide syntactic characterisations of the semantic
entailment relations |=t , |=f , and |=i (information entailment2) based on the three
lattice orderings, and a relation |= which is the intersection of |=t and |=f . A sin-
gle set of rules can be used for all four consequence relations (a feature our logic
shares with the sequent calculus framework of Wansing [16]), but testing for dif-
ferent consequence relations involves different ways of initially assigning signs to
formulas.
The presentation in this paper is meant to be technically self-contained, but is
not self-contained in terms of providing general background and motivation. For
1Many-sided calculi for many-valued logics also result from the methods used in, for example, [1, 12, 13,
21], but [8] explains why these methods are not applicable in the case of a functionally complete variant
of Belnap’s logic. Wansing [16] also makes use of many-sided sequents.
2We use the terms ‘entailment relation’ and ‘consequence relation’ purely for convenience in the case of
the information entailment relation |=i . Strictly more correct perhaps would be ‘necessary approximation’,
a term that was used in [19] for a ‘consequence’ relation based on Belnap’s A4 lattice.
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these, the reader is invited to consult the papers cited above, or the somewhat more
philosophical Wansing [17], or the full monograph Shramko & Wansing [15].
2 The Trilattice SIXT EEN3
The general theory of trilattices is subtle, but a description of SIXT EEN3 in partic-
ular is easy to give. As explained in the introduction, the domain of this trilattice is
16 = P(4), where 4 = P({1, 0}) = {T,F,N,B}. In order to obtain the three lattice
orderings, the following auxiliary definition from [14] is useful.
Definition 1 For any S ∈ 16, let
St := {x ∈ S | 1 ∈ x} (= S ∩ {T,B})
S−t := {x ∈ S | 1 /∈ x} (= S ∩ {F,N})
Sf := {x ∈ S | 0 ∈ x} (= S ∩ {F,B})
S−f := {x ∈ S | 0 /∈ x} (= S ∩ {T,N})
The idea here is that St consists of all values in S that code for truth, S−t for all
values in S that do not, Sf for all values that code for falsity, and S−f for those that
do not code for falsity. The trilattice orderings are now obtained as follows with the
help of these operations.
Definition 2 Define ≤t , ≤f , and ≤i by letting, for any S1, S2 ∈ 16:
S1 ≤t S2 ⇐⇒ St1 ⊆ St2 and S−t2 ⊆ S−t1
S1 ≤f S2 ⇐⇒ Sf2 ⊆ Sf1 and S−f1 ⊆ S−f2
S1 ≤i S2 ⇐⇒ S1 ⊆ S2
Note that ≤t is defined in terms of truth only, ≤f in terms of falsity only. We have
followed Odintsov [9] and Odintsov & Wansing [10] in letting ≤f be the inverse of
the ≤f relation originally defined in [14]. An increase in the falsity order will make
statements less false, not more so (and the falsity order could equally well be called
a nonfalsity order).
For our purposes it will be worthwile to also characterise ≤t and ≤f in the
following more concrete way. That these equivalences hold is verified by an easy
inspection.
Proposition 1 For any S1, S2 in SIXT EEN3:
S1 ≤t S2 ⇐⇒
{
T ∈ S1 ⇒ T ∈ S2 and B ∈ S1 ⇒ B ∈ S2 and
F ∈ S2 ⇒ F ∈ S1 and N ∈ S2 ⇒ N ∈ S1
S1 ≤f S2 ⇐⇒
{
F ∈ S2 ⇒ F ∈ S1 and B ∈ S2 ⇒ B ∈ S1 and
T ∈ S1 ⇒ T ∈ S2 and N ∈ S1 ⇒ N ∈ S2
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In fact the four implications characterising ≤t will lead to four auxiliary seman-
tic entailment relations in Section 4, which will, in their turn, correspond to four
syntactic consequence relations.
Each of the lattice orderings on 16 comes with meet and join operations, We will
write x for the meet and unionsqx for the join of ≤x (x ∈ {t, f, i}). Clearly, i is ∩
and unionsqi is ∪. For the other four operations the following proposition provides a handy
reference (see also [15], but note that the inverse of our ≤f is employed there).
Proposition 2 For any S, S ′ in SIXT EEN3:
T ∈ S t S′ ⇔ T ∈ S and T ∈ S′; T ∈ S unionsqt S′ ⇔ T ∈ S or T ∈ S′;
B ∈ S t S′ ⇔ B ∈ S and B ∈ S′; B ∈ S unionsqt S′ ⇔ B ∈ S or B ∈ S′;
F ∈ S t S′ ⇔ F ∈ S or F ∈ S ′; F ∈ S unionsqt S′ ⇔ F ∈ S and F ∈ S ′;
N ∈ S t S′ ⇔ N ∈ S or N ∈ S′; N ∈ S unionsqt S′ ⇔ N ∈ S and N ∈ S′;
T ∈ S f S′ ⇔ T ∈ S and T ∈ S′; T ∈ S unionsqf S′ ⇔ T ∈ S or T ∈ S′;
B ∈ S f S′ ⇔ B ∈ S or B ∈ S′; B ∈ S unionsqf S′ ⇔ B ∈ S and B ∈ S′;
F ∈ S f S′ ⇔ F ∈ S or F ∈ S ′; F ∈ S unionsqf S′ ⇔ F ∈ S and F ∈ S ′;
N ∈ S f S′ ⇔ N ∈ S and N ∈ S′; N ∈ S unionsqf S′ ⇔ N ∈ S or N ∈ S′.
SIXT EEN3 can now be defined as 〈16,t ,unionsqt ,f ,unionsqf ,i ,unionsqi〉 and the reader
may wish to verify that, for any •, ◦ ∈ {t ,unionsqt ,f ,unionsqf ,i ,unionsqi}, we have that a ◦
(b • c) = (a ◦ b) • (a ◦ c) (see also Rivieccio [11]). This makes SIXT EEN3 into
a distributive trilattice, from which it can be shown to follow that the structure is
interlaced, in the sense that all six lattice operations are monotone with respect to the
three lattice orders.
It is useful to also have available three unary operations that can be taken to be the
semantic correlates of negation connectives. The following definition provides them.
Definition 3 Define the unary operations −t , −f , and −i by letting, for any S ∈ 16:
T ∈ −t S ⇔ N ∈ S; T ∈ −f S ⇔ B ∈ S; T ∈ −iS ⇔ F /∈ S;
B ∈ −t S ⇔ F ∈ S; B ∈ −f S ⇔ T ∈ S; B ∈ −iS ⇔ N /∈ S;
F ∈ −t S ⇔ B ∈ S; F ∈ −f S ⇔ N ∈ S; F ∈ −iS ⇔ T /∈ S;
N ∈ −t S ⇔ T ∈ S; N ∈ −f S ⇔ F ∈ S; N ∈ −iS ⇔ B /∈ S;
Inspection will show that, for each pairwise distinct x, y ∈ {t, f, i},
if a ≤x b, then −xb ≤x −xa ;
if a ≤y b, then −xa ≤y −xb ;
a = −x−xa.
(Again see Rivieccio [11].)
This ends the description of SIXT EEN3 proper, but before we end this section
we would like to introduce three operators defined by Odintsov in [9], as they will
play a role in the next section. The first two can be defined as follows.
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Definition 4 Define the binary operations t , and f by letting, for any S, S′ ∈ 16:
T ∈ S t S′ ⇔ T /∈ S or T ∈ S ′; T ∈ S f S′ ⇔ T /∈ S or T ∈ S ′;
B ∈ S t S′ ⇔ B /∈ S or B ∈ S ′; B ∈ S f S′ ⇔ B /∈ S and B ∈ S ′;
F ∈ S t S′ ⇔ F /∈ S and F ∈ S ′; F ∈ S f S′ ⇔ F /∈ S and F ∈ S ′;
N ∈ S t S′ ⇔ N /∈ S and N ∈ S′; N ∈ S f S′ ⇔ N /∈ S or N ∈ S′.
Odintsov’s unary operator ⇁, which completes the three, is defined by letting ⇁
S = {T,F,N,B} − S, for any S ∈ 16.
The reader may note that ⇁ in fact equals the composition of −t , −f , and −i (in
any order) and that S t S′ =⇁S unionsqt S′, while S f S′ =⇁S unionsqf S′, for any S, S′ ∈
16.
3 Syntax, Semantics, and Expressivity
The logical language we shall use in this paper will be Ltfi, given by the follow-
ing BNF form (where p comes from some countably infinite set of propositional
constants).
ϕ ::= p | ∼t ϕ | ∼f ϕ | ∼iϕ | ϕ ∧t ϕ | ϕ ∧f ϕ | ϕ ∧i ϕ
This set-up may be somewhat spartan, but other connectives can be defined and the
set {∼t ,∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f ,∧i} is in fact functionally complete, as we shall see shortly.
Let us provide the language Ltfi with a semantics. The following definition will
not come as a surprise.
Definition 5 A valuation function is a function V from the sentences of Ltfi to 16
such that
V (ϕ ∧t ψ) = V (ϕ) t V (ψ); V (∼tϕ) = −tV (ϕ);
V (ϕ ∧f ψ) = V (ϕ) f V (ψ); V (∼f ϕ) = −f V (ϕ);
V (ϕ ∧i ψ) = V (ϕ) i V (ψ); V (∼iϕ) = −iV (ϕ).
Given this interpretation of the language, we clearly can also define connectives
denoting the operations unionsqt , unionsqf , unionsqi , ⇁, t , and f via the obvious De Morgan
rules and the equivalences discussed in the previous section.
Definition 6 The following abbreviations will be in force.
ϕ ∨t ψ := ∼t (∼tϕ ∧t ∼tψ);
ϕ ∨f ψ := ∼f (∼f ϕ ∧f ∼fψ);
ϕ ∨i ψ := ∼i (∼iϕ ∧i ∼iψ);
¬ϕ := ∼t∼f ∼iϕ;
ϕ →t ψ := ¬ϕ ∨t ψ;
ϕ →f ψ := ¬ϕ ∨f ψ.
It is easily verified that V (¬ϕ) =⇁V(ϕ) etc.
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It will also be possible to define sentences that constantly denote a given element
of 16, regardless of the valuation. This can be done for each element of 16. In the fol-
lowing definition we have chosen names for these sentences that serve as a mnemonic
for the element denoted (e.g. V (nfb) = {N,F,B}, for any V ).
Definition 7 Let p0 be some fixed propositional constant. The following abbrevia-
tions will be used.
tb := p0 →t p0; t := tb ∨f ∅;
nf :=∼t tb; n := nf ∨f ∅;
∅ := tb ∧i nf; nt := tb ∨f nf;
nftb :=∼i ∅; ftb := tb ∧f nftb;
b := tb ∧f ∅; nfb := nf ∧f nftb;
ntb := tb ∨f nftb; fb := tb ∧f nf;
f := nf ∧f ∅; nb := b ∧t ntb;
nft := nf ∨f nftb; ft := t ∧t ftb;
Let us call a sentence ϕ bivalent if V (ϕ) = {T,B} or V (ϕ) = {N,F} for any
valuation V (note that {T,B} is the top element of the ≤t order, while {N,F} is its
bottom element). It is useful to have connectives at our disposal that always give a
result that is bivalent. For arbitrary ϕ, consider the sentence Tϕ defined as
ϕ ∧t ∼iϕ ∧t ∼f ϕ ∧t ∼f ∼iϕ.
We find by inspection, using Proposition 2 and Definition 3, that, for any V ,
T ∈ V (Tϕ) ⇐⇒ T ∈ V (ϕ) and F /∈ V (ϕ) and B ∈ V (ϕ) and N /∈ V (ϕ)
⇐⇒ B ∈ V (Tϕ)
F ∈ V (Tϕ) ⇐⇒ F ∈ V (ϕ) or T /∈ V (ϕ) or N ∈ V (ϕ) or B /∈ V (ϕ)
⇐⇒ N ∈ V (Tϕ)
From this it follows that V (Tϕ) = {T,B} iff V (ϕ) = {T,B} and that V (Tϕ) = {N,F}
iff V (ϕ) = {T,B}. This can be used to define other connectives giving bivalent
results.
Definition 8 We define the following connectives.
ϕ t ψ := T(ϕ →t ψ)
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ t ψ) ∧t (ψ t ϕ)
In [9] Odintsov shows that, for every S, S′ ∈ 16, S ≤t S′ iff S t S′ = {T,B}.
From this and the definition of ϕ t ψ it follows that, for all V, V (ϕ t ψ) =
{T,B1} iff V (ϕ) ≤t V (ψ) and V (ϕ t ψ) = {N,F} iff V (ϕ) ≤t V (ψ). The
≡ connective expresses identity, as V (ϕ ≡ ψ) = {T,B} iff V (ϕ) = V (ψ), and
V (ϕ ≡ ψ) = {N,F} otherwise.
We now turn to the functional completeness theorem, for which we will assume
that p0, p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . . is some fixed enumeration of the set of propositional
constants (p0 was already used in Definition 7). If g is an n-ary truth function
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g : 16n → 16 and ϕ is an Ltfi formula such that exactly p0, p1, . . . , pn occur in ϕ,
we say that ϕ expresses g if V (ϕ) = g(V (p1), . . . , V (pn)), for each valuation V .
Proposition 3 Every truth function g : 16n → 16 is expressed by an Ltfi formula.
Proof The proof generalises that of Muskens [7] for the four-valued case and
proceeds by induction on n. Zero-place truth functions can be identified with the
elements of 16 and inspection of Definition 7 shows that each element of that set
is denoted by a constant defined there. For S ∈ 16 we will use the notation S to
refer to the term given in Definition 7 that denotes S. For the induction step, let
g : 16n+1 → 16 be an n + 1-ary function. For each S ∈ 16 define the n-ary truth
function gS : 16n → 16 by letting gS(S1, . . . , Sn) = g(S1, . . . , Sn, S). Using induc-
tion we find that each gS (S ∈ 16) is expressed by some formula ϕS . Let ϕ be the
formula ∧
t
U∈16
∼t (pn+1 ≡ U) ∨t ϕU ,
where
∧
t is used to denote a finite ∧t -conjunction of formulas. Let V be an arbitrary
valuation. Then V (pn+1) = S, for some S ∈ 16 and, for any S′ = S, it holds that
V (∼t(pn+1 ≡ S′) ∨t ϕS′) = {T,B}, while V (∼t(pn+1 ≡ S) ∨t ϕS) = V (ϕS). It
follows that V (ϕ) = V (ϕS) = gS(V (p1), . . . , V (pn)) = g(V (p1), . . . , V (pn), S),
so that V (ϕ) = g(V (p1), . . . , V (pn), V (pn+1)), and, since V was arbitrary, that ϕ
expresses g.
It is also instructive to see that {∼t ,∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f ,∧i} is a minimal set that is
functionally complete.
Proposition 4 No proper subset of {∼t ,∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f ,∧i} can express every truth
function g : 16n → 16.
Proof In order to see that ∼t is essential, consider a unary g such that g({T,B}) =
{N,F}. Each operator underlying one of the connectives ∼f , ∼i , ∧t , ∧f , and ∧i
will return the value {T,B} when its argument(s) all take that value, so no formula in
{∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f ,∧i} can express g.
That ∧i cannot be left out can be seen by considering the set
O := {{T,B}, {N,F}, {N,T}, {F,B}} .
Each connective in {∼t ,∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f } will return a value from O when fed argu-
ments from O . It follows that no formula built up from these connectives can take
the value ∅ when all its propositional constants are assigned elements of O . So no
formula in {∼t ,∼f ,∼i ,∧t ,∧f } can express i .
For the other four cases proceed similarly.
The last proposition of this section shows that some logics considered in the
literature (see Odintsov [9] and Wansing’s [16]) are equally expressive.
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Proposition 5 The languages
L →ttf : ϕ ::= p | ∼tϕ | ∼f ϕ | ϕ ∧t ϕ | ϕ ∧f ϕ | ϕ →t ϕ
L
→f
tf : ϕ ::= p | ∼tϕ | ∼f ϕ | ϕ ∧t ϕ | ϕ ∧f ϕ | ϕ →f ϕ
L ∗tf : ϕ ::= p | ∼tϕ | ∼f ϕ | ϕ ∧t ϕ | ϕ ∧f ϕ | ϕ →t ϕ | ϕ →f ϕ
L ∼itf : ϕ ::= p | ∼tϕ | ∼f ϕ | ∼iϕ | ϕ ∧t ϕ | ϕ ∧f ϕ
are all equally expressive.
Proof Observe that Definition 6 did not make use of ∧i to obtain →t and →f , so
L ∼itf is at least as expressive as any of L
→t
tf , L
→f
tf , or L
∗
tf . To see that, conversely,
any of L →ttf , L
→f
tf , and L
∗
tf are at least as expressive as L
∼i
tf , use Odintsov’s [9]
sand Wansing’s [16] observations that ¬ϕ can be defined as ϕ →t ∼t(p0 →t p0)
or as ϕ →f ∼f (p0 →f p0), together with the fact that ∼i ϕ is equivalent with
∼t∼f¬ϕ.
4 Semantic and Syntactic Consequence
We now come to the characterisation of consequence relations. Let us first give
semantic definitions.
Definition 9 Using for greatest lower bound in the ≤x order (x ∈ {t, f, i}) and⊔
x for least upper bound, let the relations |=t , |=f , |=i , and |= between sets of
sentences be defined in the following way.
We have thrown the relation |= into the mix because it models a constraint on
reasoning that not only rejects loss of truth but also rejects increase in falsity when
going from premises to conclusions. Requiring a computer network to preserve both
truth and nonfalsity while drawing conclusions seems a reasonable demand.
The definition of |=i is just a fancy way of expressing that  |=i  if and only if⋂
γ∈ V (γ ) ⊆
⋃
δ∈ V (δ), for all V , but we have put it in the form above in order to
stress the uniformity of the three definitions. It is worthwile, however, to decompose
the |=t and |=f entailment relations a bit further.
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Proposition 6  |=t  holds iff the conjunction of the following four statements
holds for all valuations V .
T ∈ V (γ ) for all γ ∈  =⇒ T ∈ V (δ) for some δ ∈ 
B ∈ V (γ ) for all γ ∈  =⇒ B ∈ V (δ) for some δ ∈ 
F ∈ V (δ) for all δ ∈  =⇒ F ∈ V (γ ) for some γ ∈ 
N ∈ V (δ) for all δ ∈  =⇒ N ∈ V (γ ) for some γ ∈ 
 |=f , on the other hand, is true iff the conjunction of the following four
statements holds for all V .
T ∈ V (γ ) for all γ ∈  =⇒ T ∈ V (δ) for some δ ∈ 
B ∈ V (δ) for all δ ∈  =⇒ B ∈ V (γ ) for some γ ∈ 
F ∈ V (δ) for all δ ∈  =⇒ F ∈ V (γ ) for some γ ∈ 
N ∈ V (γ ) for all γ ∈  =⇒ N ∈ V (δ) for some δ ∈ 
Proof By inspection, using Propositions 1 and 2.
These decompositions inspire us to define four auxiliary entailment relations.
Definition 10 For each x ∈ {T,B,F,N}, define the auxiliary entailment relation |=x
by
 |=x  ⇐⇒ x ∈
⋂
γ∈
V (γ ) ⇒ x ∈
⋃
δ∈
V (δ), for all valuations V
Note that no pair of these relations or their inverses are equivalent on sets of
premises and conclusions from Ltfi.
Proposition 7 The relations |=T, |=F, |=N, |=B, and their inverses are pairwise
distinct on Ltfi.
Proof None of these relations is equivalent with any of their inverses, for∅ |=x nftb
for all x ∈ {T,B,F,N} while nftb |=x ∅ holds for none. Note further that nftb |=x n
holds for x = N, but not for any other of the three values for x, so that |=N is different
from |=T, |=F, and |=B. Showing that other relations |=x and |=y are distinct goes in
an entirely similar way.
Proposition 7 is in stark contrast with what is the case in less expressive logics, in
which not all elements of 16 can be named. See Shramko & Wansing [14, Lemma
4.2]. A similar situation obtains with respect to Belnap’s original four-valued logic
versus a functionally complete extension (see Muskens [8]).
Given our definitions thus far the following equivalences between our main con-
sequence relations and certain combinations of the auxiliary ones obviously hold.
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 |=t  ⇐⇒  |=T  and  |=B  and  |=F  and  |=N 
 |=f  ⇐⇒  |=T  and  |=B  and  |=F  and  |=N 
 |=i  ⇐⇒  |=T  and  |=B  and  |=F  and  |=N 
The idea now is to define four syntactic entailment relations x (x ∈
{T,B,F,N}), each one characterising its semantic counterpart |=x . In this way the
relations |=t , |=f , |=i , and |= will also be provided with syntactic characterisations.
We will do this with the help of the signed tableau calculus PL16 (the name stands
for ‘16-valued propositional logic’). This calculus will make use of eight signs t,
f, n, b,  t,  f,  n, and  b, whose informal interpretations will become clear shortly.
A signed Ltfi sentence will be a pair x : ϕ, where x is one of these signs and ϕ is
an Ltfi sentence. In Table 1 nine rule schemes are given which form the heart of our
calculus. Note that each of the three conjunctions comes with two rule schemes, each
allowing four instantiations of a variable x ranging over signs, while negations come
with one rule scheme each and can each be instantiated in eight different ways. The
rule schemes thus sum up eight rules for each connective. Conjunction rules do not
change the signs of formulas, but negation rules always do.
For formal considerations it will be useful to have a general form for rules, for
which we choose ϑ/B1, . . . , Bn, where ϑ is a signed sentence called the top formula
of the rule and each Bi is a set of signed sentences called a set of bottom formu-
las of the rule. For example, one instantiation of (∧2f ) could formally be written as
 n : ϕ ∧f ψ / { n : ϕ}, { n : ψ} and one instantiation of the (∧1i ) rule could be
expressed as f : ϕ ∧i ψ / {f : ϕ, f : ψ}. This general form is useful, even though
neither the number of sets of bottom formulas nor their cardinality ever exceeds 2.
Tableaux will be certain sets of branches. Let us study the latter and some of the
syntactic and semantic properties of notions connected with them before we define
the tableaux themselves.
Table 1 Tableau expansion rules for PL16
x : ϕ ∧t ψ
x : ϕ, x : ψ (∧
1
t )
x : ϕ ∧t ψ
x : ϕ | x : ψ (∧
2
t )
x : ∼t ϕ
y : ϕ (∼t )
x ∈ { n,  f, t, b} x ∈ {n, f,  t,  b} 〈x, y〉 or 〈y, x〉 ∈
{〈n, t〉, 〈f, b〉, 〈 n,  t〉, 〈 f,  b〉}
x : ϕ ∧f ψ
x : ϕ, x : ψ (∧
1
f )
x : ϕ ∧f ψ
x : ϕ | x : ψ (∧
2
f )
x : ∼f ϕ
y : ϕ (∼f )
x ∈ {n,  f, t,  b} x ∈ { n, f,  t, b} 〈x, y〉 or 〈y, x〉 ∈
{〈n, f〉, 〈t, b〉, 〈 n,  f〉, 〈 t,  b〉}
x : ϕ ∧i ψ
x : ϕ, x : ψ (∧
1
i )
x : ϕ ∧i ψ
x : ϕ | x : ψ (∧
2
i )
x : ∼i ϕ
y : ϕ (∼i )
x ∈ {n, f, t, b} x ∈ { n,  f,  t,  b} 〈x, y〉 or 〈y, x〉 ∈
{〈n,  b〉, 〈f,  t〉, 〈 n, b〉, 〈 f, t〉}
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Definition 11 A (tableau) branch is a set of signed sentences. A branch is closed if
it contains signed sentences x : ϕ and  x : ϕ for x ∈ {n, f, t, b}. A branch that is not
closed is called open.
If B is a branch and x : ϕ ∈ B is a signed sentence, then x : ϕ is fulfilled in B
if (a) ϕ is atomic, or (b) ϕ is complex and Bi ⊆ B for one set of bottom formulas
of the unique rule x : ϕ/B1, . . . , Bn. A branch B is completed if B is closed or ϑ is
fulfilled in B for every ϑ ∈ B.
Satisfiability of branches will be a central notion. We define it as follows.
Definition 12 Let 
 be a set of signed Ltfi sentences and let V be an Ltfi valuation.
We say that V satisfies 
 iff the following statements hold.
t : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ T ∈ V (ϕ)  t : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ T /∈ V (ϕ)
f : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ F ∈ V (ϕ)  f : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ F /∈ V (ϕ)
n : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ N ∈ V (ϕ)  n : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ N /∈ V (ϕ)
b : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ B ∈ V (ϕ)  b : ϕ ∈ 
 ⇒ B /∈ V (ϕ)
So the signs wear their interpretations on their sleeves. We also say that V satisfies ϑ
if V satisfies {ϑ} and that a signed sentence or a set of signed sentences is satisfiable
if some V satisfies it.
Satisfaction is preserved from the top formula in a rule to one of its sets of bottom
formulas and vice versa, as the following proposition attests.
Proposition 8 For any instantiation of a rule scheme in Table 1, a valuation satisfies
the top formula of the rule if and only if it satisfies a set of bottom formulas of the
rule.
Proof By inspection, using Proposition 2 and Definition 3.
It is immediate from the definitions that a branch that is satisfiable cannot be
closed. The following also holds.
Lemma 1 A branch that is completed and open is satisfiable.
Proof Let B be completed and open and, for all propositional constants p, let
V (p) = {x | (x = T and t : p ∈ B) or (x = F and f : p ∈ B) or
(x = N and n : p ∈ B) or (x = B and b : p ∈ B)}
We prove by induction on formula complexity that V satisfies all signed sentences
x : ϕ ∈ B. If ϕ is a propositional constant, then V satisfies x : ϕ by the definition
just given and the fact that B is open. So, let x : ϕ ∈ B for some sign x and complex
formula ϕ. Since B is completed, a set of bottom formulas B of the unique rule
of which x : ϕ is the top formula is a subset of B. But, for all signed sentences
y : ψ ∈ B, ψ is a subformula of ϕ, so that, by induction, V satisfies y : ψ . So V
satisfies B, and by Proposition 8, V satisfies x : ϕ.
Analytic Tableaux for all of SIXT EEN3 485
Let us now define tableaux.
Definition 13 Let T and T ′ be sets of branches. We say that T ′ is a one-step
expansion of T if, for some B ∈ T , ϑ ∈ B, and rule ϑ/B1, . . . , Bn, T ′ =
(T \{B}) ∪ {B ∪ B1, . . . ,B ∪ Bn}.
Let B be a finite branch. A set of branches T is a tableau with initial branch B if
there is a sequence T0,T1, . . . ,Tn such that T0 = {B}, Tn = T , and each Ti+1 is
a one-step expansion of Ti (0 ≤ i < n). We also say that a finite B has tableau T
if T is a tableau with initial branch B. A tableau T is open if some B ∈ T is open,
otherwise T is closed. A tableau is completed if each of its branches is completed.
Proposition 9 (a) Every finite branch has a tableau that is completed. (b) Let T be
a tableau with initial branch B. If B is satisfiable then there is a satisfiable branch
B′ such that B ⊆ B′ ∈ T .
Proof The (a) part is proved just as in classical propositional logic. For the (b) part,
consider the sequence {B} = T0,T1, . . . ,Tn = T that must exist according to the
previous definition and do an induction on n, using Proposition 8.
With the help of this Proposition and Lemma 1 the following lemma now follows
immediately.
Lemma 2 A finite set of signed sentences is unsatisfiable iff it has a closed tableau.
Proof Suppose the finite set of signed sentences B is unsatisfiable. By the previous
proposition B has a completed tableau T . Since B is included in every branch of
T , no such branch can be satisfiable. By Lemma 1 it follows that T must be closed.
Conversely, assume that B is satisfiable. Then B has a completed tableau T with at
least one satisfiable branch, so that T cannot be closed.
With the help of our tableaux we define four auxiliary syntactic consequence
relations.
Definition 14 Let  and  be finite sets of Ltfi sentences and define
 T  := {t : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } ∪ { t : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } has a closed tableau;
 F  := {f : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } ∪ { f : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } has a closed tableau;
 N  := {n : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } ∪ { n : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } has a closed tableau;
 B  := {b : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } ∪ { b : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } has a closed tableau.
Using Lemma 2 it immediately follows that these provide sound and complete
characterisations of the auxiliary semantic entailment relations defined earlier.
Lemma 3  |=x  ⇐⇒  x , for each x ∈ {T,B,F,N}.
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Proof Let BT = {t : ϕ | ϕ ∈ } ∪ { t : ϕ | ϕ ∈ }. Then  |=T  ⇐⇒ BT is
unsatisfiable ⇐⇒ BT has a closed tableau ⇐⇒  T . The other cases are quite
similar.
Definition 15 Let  and  be finite sets of Ltfi sentences. Define
 t  ⇐⇒  T  and  B  and  F  and  N 
 f  ⇐⇒  T  and  B  and  F  and  N 
 i  ⇐⇒  T  and  B  and  F  and  N 
   ⇐⇒  t  and  f 
From Lemma 3 and our definitions the next theorem now immediately follows.
Theorem 1 If  and  are finite sets of Ltfi sentences the following hold.
 |=t  ⇐⇒  t   |=f  ⇐⇒  f 
 |=i  ⇐⇒  i   |=  ⇐⇒  t  and  f 
This solves the characterisation problem of the logics connected with Ltfi. Finite
sequents can now be decided with the help of developing several tableaus. In general
four tableaus are needed to decide |=t , |=f , or |=i sequents and six are needed to
decide sequents on the basis of |=. It may of course happen that fewer tableaux are
needed if sequents have a special form. For |=t sequents from Lt , the language based
on {∧t ,∼t }, only one tableau needs to be developed, for example, as the others will
be isomorphic. This is already clear from Shramko & Wansing’s [14, Lemma 4.2],
but can also be glossed from our tableau rules.
5 Conclusion
We have given an analytic tableau calculus PL16 for the whole of SIXT EEN3, with
connectives for all its truth functions. While each connective comes with eight rules
and in general several tableaux must be developed in order to check entailments (six
tableaux, for instance, in the case of |= entailments), the calculus is still essentially
simple, as the many rules can be brought under much fewer rule schemes and the
system that results has a remarkable family resemblance to the usual signed tableau
calculus for classical propositional logic.3
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